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Investors and Employees as Relief
Defendants in Investment Fraud
Receiverships:
Promoting Efficiency by Following the
Plain Meaning of “Legitimate Claim or
Ownership Interest”
JARED WILKERSON

Relief defendants are nominal, innocent parties who hold funds traceable
to the receivership but have no legitimate claim or ownership interest in
them. These nominal parties, as opposed to full or primary defendants,
have no cause of action asserted against them, and if they show no
legitimate claim to the funds traced to the receivership, the funds are disgorged — generally at summary judgment. This seemingly simple relief
defendant tool is used by receivers and regulatory agencies to quickly
recover receivership funds for ultimate distribution to creditors. Recently, however, conflict has arisen in federal courts concerning the meaning
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest.” Where courts fail to uphold
the plain meaning of those words, confusion and unpredictability ensue,
leading to enormous costs for creditors as receivers, on the receivership’s
dime, attempt to claw back funds from relief defendants. To prevent such
unnecessary costs in the future, the plain meaning of “legitimate claim
or ownership interest” must be reinforced to protect, at minimum, the
amount of investors’ returned principal and the amount of employees’
reasonable compensation.
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I

magine yourself as one of the tens of thousands of investors holding a
certificate of deposit from Stanford International Bank in early 2009.
The CD has the blessing of the SEC and CFTC and has performed
beautifully for about 15 years. The broker-dealer, Stanford Group Company (“SGC”), is a member of SIPC and the whole operation, with its
lavish headquarters in Houston and offices around the world, appears perfectly prosperous. Yet on February 17, 2009, you receive news that FBI
agents have stormed SGC headquarters in an SEC investigation alleging
fraud or even a Ponzi scheme at Stanford, and that the federal court for the
Northern District of Texas has appointed a receiver, Dallas attorney Ralph
Janvey, to clean up the growing insolvency mess.1 Most importantly, you
discover that your SGC brokerage account with a New Jersey holding
company has been frozen.2 Within days, the receiver hires an army of attorneys and accountants who all start billing their time to the receivership.3
You, confused and worried by the affair, wonder what will happen next.
Within days, Janvey sends you a demand letter saying that he wants all
of your Stanford investment money, both principal and interest, for a pool
that will give all investors a low pro rata distribution. You are stunned that
the receiver would suggest that you simply hand over your contractual
returns, especially since he is attempting to gain access to CD proceeds
not only in your brokerage account, but also money sitting in your bank
account, money that made your mortgage payments last year, and money
that paid your daughter’s college tuition. You storm to your SGC financial
advisor to find out what he knows and to ask him why he allowed you to
invest in a fraud. He, who has also invested in the CD, tearfully promises
that he knows nothing of the alleged fraud and says that the receiver plans
to claw back all of his commissions, salary, and employee forgivable loans
related to CD sales.4 He also tells you that the receiver has fired him and
all other advisors.5 Worst of all, he says, the receiver plans to pursue
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both investors and advisors as “relief defendants” — a classification that
will largely prevent you from defending yourself, even though the receiver
does not claim that you did anything wrong.6 Now, confused more than
angry, you hasten immediately to your attorney.
This ugly scene, slightly fictionalized, demonstrates the uncertainty
facing innocent investors and employees in Ponzi schemes and other investment fraud cleanups.7 Most starkly displayed in the $8 billion Stanford matter, the idea of treating investors and employees as though they
had no legitimate claim to their funds has been around for some time.
Conversation on this issue has spread on news sites and through the blogosphere, but there is a surprising lack of academic literature examining the
pros and cons of what seems at times to be either self-serving or capricious
receiver action. This article clarifies and directs the conversation and will
help prevent abuse of investors and employees in the future. The article
begins with an introduction to and brief history of relief defendants —
nominal parties who hold receivership funds but have no legitimate claim
to them — in investment frauds.
Though the relief defendant concept is becoming well-known, it has
been a contested legal concept for decades in fraud cleanups. Indeed,
receivers, trustees, and judges have diverse opinions on whether investors and employees should ever be proper relief defendants and, if so,
the amount of investment proceeds a receiver can claw back from them.8
Thus, the law of relief defendants is economically inefficient because it is
unpredictable. Some problematic reasoning has already led to harsh outcomes for two of the most attractive clawback targets for receivers cleaning up financial frauds: investors and employees. In particular, the following should be antithetical to the law of relief defendants: (1) that investors,
as relief defendants, can be made to disgorge the amount of principal they
invested;9 and (2) that employees, as relief defendants, can be made to
disgorge their reasonable remuneration.
The basis of these problems is a misunderstanding or misconstruction
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” which is the key to determining whether a party is a proper relief defendant or must be pursued as a
“full defendant,” that is, as a party whose unjust enrichment, receipt of a
fraudulent conveyance, or other participation in or benefit from the fraud
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allows for a cause of action (with its panoply of defenses) against her. This
article next introduces these two problems by way of a few salient cases.
After each problem, the obvious solution is discussed: to reinforce the idea
that investors have a legitimate claim to their principal and that employees
have a legitimate claim to their reasonable remuneration — even in Ponzi
schemes. Clarification of the status of investors and employees will not
only minimize economic hardship on innocent parties, but will also reduce
the time that receivers (and defense attorneys) spend litigating, thereby
leaving more of the receivership estate for distribution to creditors.
The legal problems then are illustrated, where the Stanford case is
used to display the consequences of disregarding the plain meaning of
“legitimate claim or ownership interest.” In that case, the receiver and his
contingent of professional billers burned through money meant for investors and other creditors while fruitlessly pursuing other innocent investors and employees as relief defendants. If the relief defendant concept
had been clearer, this likely would not have happened. Adhering to the
plain definition of “legitimate claim” will lead to predictability and efficiency by discouraging unnecessary litigation, maintaining the size of
the receivership estate, and providing for an earlier distribution of receivership funds to creditors. Receivers, incentivized by the pool of money
sitting in receivership, will probably continue to push the envelope even
after these particular problems are finally settled, but perhaps by helping
to focus the discussion surrounding relief defendants in investment frauds,
investors and employees will be saved from needless and costly attacks by
misguided receivers.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELIEF DEFENDANTS IN INVESTMENT
FRAUD RECEIVERSHIPS
A federal receivership in a securities fraud case is essentially the equity-based version of a bankruptcy trusteeship.10 That is, the receiver, appointed as an officer of the court,11 steps into the shoes of the directors and
managers of the accused entity for the benefit of creditors — who begin
to queue shortly after the receiver’s appointment. Rather than the web of
bankruptcy code rules governing trustee behavior, receivers are governed
246
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by broad equitable principles as defined in the receiver’s appointment order. Indeed, the need for equity and flexibility is identified in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 66, which states that:
These rules govern an action in which the appointment of a receiver is
sought or a receiver sues or is sued. But the practice in administering
an estate by a receiver or a similar court-appointed officer must accord
with the historical practice in federal courts or with a local rule. An
action in which a receiver has been appointed may be dismissed only
by court order.
By handing decision-making in administration of the entity in receivership
to courts following the “historical practice” of other courts, the drafters of
the Federal Rules recognized the need to leave this area to case-by-case
analysis and common law development. Although the common law does
structure receivership dealings and precedent is important, “The district
court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine relief in an equity
receivership.”12
The principles governing equity receivers are usually reflected in the
receiver’s appointment order by the trial court handling the enforcement
matter.13 Ordinarily, appointment orders broadly state that the receiver’s
duty is to retain and recover assets of the entity in receivership for the
benefit of the creditors of that entity.14

Relief Defendants
Relief defendants are “part[ies] to an action who ha[ve] no control
over it and no financial interest in its outcome….”15 Since relief defendants, mere custodians or gratuitous recipients of funds, have no stake
in the outcome and are accused of no wrongdoing or unjust enrichment,
receivers can, by summary judgment, disgorge funds from them without
asserting a cause of action as long as the relief defendants cannot show a
legitimate claim to the funds.
By contrast, full defendants are parties who must be given full service
of process, pursued under some cognizable cause of action, and must be
afforded the ability to fully litigate his liability under that cause of action.16
247
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Naming a party as a relief defendant cannot be used as a quick way of obtaining disgorgement from a party if that party has an interest in the funds
or is a wrongdoer; such parties do not fit the definition of a relief defendant
and must be pursued as full defendants under some cause of action that
affords full defensive rights.17
In the receivership context, the procedural tool known as a “relief” or
“nominal” defendant is one who:
[H]as no ownership interest in the property that is the subject of litigation but may be joined in the lawsuit to aid the recovery of relief.
A relief defendant is not accused of wrongdoing, but a federal court
may order equitable relief against such a person where that person
(1) has received ill-gotten funds, and (2) does not have a legitimate
claim to those funds…. A “nominal defendant” is a person who can be
joined to aid the recovery of relief without an additional assertion of
subject matter jurisdiction only because he has no ownership interest
in the property which is the subject of litigation. Because a nominal
defendant has no ownership interest in the funds at issue, once the
district court has acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation regarding the conduct that produced the funds, it is not necessary
for the court to separately obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim to the funds held by the nominal defendant; rather, the nominal
defendant is joined purely as a means of facilitating collection. In
short, a nominal defendant is part of a suit only as the holder of assets
that must be recovered in order to afford complete relief; no cause of
action is asserted against a nominal defendant.18
Often — and particularly when there are many relief defendants — the
court will institute summary proceedings to decide whether the relief defendants have a legitimate claim to the funds they hold and, if they do not, to
quickly disgorge the funds.19 There is no need for relief defendants to show
exclusive ownership of the disputed funds to avoid disgorgement; they must
generally show only some legitimate claim or ownership interest (beyond
mere possession) to prevent summary disgorgement.20 In plain language,
a “legitimate claim” is merely “any right to payment… even if contingent
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or provisional” that is lawful, genuine, or valid;21 an ownership “interest” is
simply a “legal share in [ownership]; all or part of a legal or equitable claim
to or right in property.”22 An innocent employee who earns remuneration
and can show that the remuneration is reasonable — that is, that the payment
does not so far outweigh services rendered so as to become a gift or mere
transfer of funds — clearly has a legitimate claim, arising out of the employment relationship, to the compensation. Likewise, an innocent investor
always has a legitimate claim to investment returns up to the amount of her
principal invested, and, in many situations — such as when debt holders are
contractually promised a fixed rate of return — investors must be seen to
have a legitimate claim to interest as well.
The quintessential relief defendant is a bank or a trustee holding funds
on behalf of others, the addition of whom as a nominal party has no effect
on jurisdiction.23 For example, in SEC v. Absolutefuture.com,24 defendants,
after acquiring funds fraudulently, placed those funds into an account with
relief defendant Exchange Bank & Trust, Inc. Since the relief defendant
was merely holding funds that, for its purposes, belonged to someone else,
it had no legitimate claim or ownership interest in them.
The relief defendant concept, though very simple on its face, has not
had much time to develop, so it is perhaps understandable that the courts
have varied so widely in its application. True, the SEC began using the
nominal defendant concept in a limited way decades ago, using it as a
tactic to add a needed party, such as the corporation itself, which would
often align itself with the SEC’s position.25 Today, however, relief defendants are used in cases initiated by the SEC, CFTC, and other agencies as
a means of quickly obtaining funds that belong to the receivership but are
being held by someone else in a merely custodial or possessory capacity.26
Reaching this point, which is still unstable, has taken time. One major
turning point was SEC v. Cherif, which demonstrated that the stage was set
by 1991 to use the relief defendant tool not just as a means of adding entities as procedurally nominal parties but for clawbacks against individuals
who had received funds originally obtained by fraud.27 The court in Cherif,
faced with a nominal defendant who might well have provided services in
return for compensation, inadvertently gave birth to confusion, and parties
on both sides of the debate on the breadth of the relief defendant tool use
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Cherif to bolster their position.
In that case, defendant Danny Cherif, an ex-employee of a Chicago
bank, used his still-functional employee magnetic identification card to
enter the firm’s building outside working hours, obtain confidential information about the bank’s corporate clients, and then trade on the stock market using that information before it went public.28 As part of his scheme,
he opened a brokerage account in the name of his brother-in-law, nominal
defendant Khaled Sanchou. The SEC obtained a preliminary freeze on the
account and sought to disgorge any money from it that was connected to
Cherif’s fraud.29 Sanchou argued that the freeze must be lifted because the
district court had no jurisdiction over him. The Seventh Circuit held that
subject matter jurisdiction would not be a problem for the SEC if Sanchou
truly was a nominal defendant:30
Because the nominal defendant is a “trustee, agent, or depositary,”
who has possession of the funds which are the subject of litigation, he
must often be joined purely as a means of facilitating collection. The
court needs to order the nominal defendant to turn over funds to the
prevailing party when the dispute between the parties is resolved. A
nominal defendant is not a real party in interest, however, because he
has no interest in the subject matter litigated. His relation to the suit
is merely incidental and “it is of no moment [to him] whether the one
or the other side in [the] controversy succeed[s].” Because of the noninterested status of the nominal defendant, there is no claim against
him and it is unnecessary to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over
him once jurisdiction over the defendant is established.31
Noting that the factual record was insufficient to conclude that Sanchou had no hand in the scheme or otherwise was an uninterested party,
the Court remanded and said that the district court should come to one of
two conclusions: either that (1) Sanchou was an innocent custodian of the
funds, in which case he would be a proper relief defendant and subject
matter jurisdiction would be irrelevant; or that (2) Sanchou had a hand
in Cherif’s scheme, and the preliminary freeze would have to be vacated,
after which the SEC could amend its complaint to state a claim directly
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against Sanchou and freeze the account again as it sought relief.32 Thus,
the court assumed that Sanchou either had no legitimate claim to the funds
or that he was a wrongdoer.
The problem with Cherif is the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to have
the lower court apply the relief defendant label to Sanchou, who may have
been — rather than an innocent party with no claim to the funds — an investor or an employee with an ownership interest in the funds in his brokerage account. He could have both had a legitimate claim to the funds and
been innocent. That is, Sanchou may have had an innocent agreement with
Cherif to receive a portion of the trading proceeds in return for Cherif’s use
of Sanchou’s name and his account — or he may have had a similar agreement to receive a salary in return for the service he was providing Cherif.
Thus, Sanchou could have been an investor, an employee, or something between the two. The court, however, did not attempt to resolve this problem
and thus left the relief defendant concept open to interpretation. The Seventh Circuit’s willingness to instruct the district court to add Sanchou as a
nominal defendant without analyzing whether he had a legitimate claim to
the funds made Cherif a ripe candidate for both attackers and defenders of
innocent investors and employees in financial frauds.
Consequently, after Cherif, the relief defendant concept received further analysis, but what constituted a legitimate claim remained, and still
remains, vague. Courts thus far addressing the issue agree on one thing:
the definition of a relief defendant is a party against whom no wrongdoing
is alleged but who holds receivership funds to which she has no legitimate
claim or ownership interest.33 Thus, courts agree that relief defendants can
only avoid disgorgement by summary judgment by showing a legitimate
claim or ownership interest in the funds they hold.34 However, despite
these basic agreements, interpretations still conflict. As shown below, the
entire controversy revolves around the meaning of “legitimate claim or
ownership interest.” If courts bend the meaning of these plain words, they
can — and have — come to diverse and, importantly, unpredictable outcomes. Settling this meaning will mean less confusion, less litigation, less
money in the receiver’s pocket and more in investors’ hands.
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DEFINING “LEGITIMATE CLAIM OR OWNERSHIP INTEREST”
FOR INVESTORS AND EMPLOYEES
Cherif, in addition to the flexible nature of equity decisions,35 kept the
door open for divergent views on how investors and employees should be
treated when added as relief defendants. Some courts, such as the Sixth
Circuit in SEC v. George,36 have inappropriately found that investors do
not have a legitimate claim or ownership interest in, at a minimum, the
amount of their principal investment.37 Other courts, acknowledging the
plain meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” protect, at minimum, investors’ principal.38
Likewise, some courts addressing employees as relief defendants
summarily, and improperly, order disgorgement of the employees’ funds
even though, as relief defendants, no wrongdoing is alleged against them.
Other courts recognize that innocent employees have acquired a legitimate
claim by providing services in return for compensation.39 The uncertainty for investors and employees added as relief defendants in investment
frauds needs to be leveled by more authority in favor of the clear meaning
of “legitimate claim or ownership interest.” The cost stemming from such
uncertainty, as shown below, can be devastating to relief defendants.

Investors as Relief Defendants
The most important case holding that investor relief defendants are
subject to summary disgorgement of both principal and interest is SEC
v. George.40 There, Steven Thorn, Derrick McKinney, and Rick Malizia
solicited 550 investors for what they advertised as secretive “European
fixed-instrument securities, including medium term notes.”41 The investors were told that their investment would be pooled with others’ to reach
threshold levels for preferred rates of return. In reality, no investment
occurred and Thorn, McKinney, and Malizia pooled the money to pay
monthly “returns” to investors and make lavish personal purchases for
themselves.42 In short, it was a Ponzi scheme.
In addition to claims against Thorn, McKinney, and Malizia, the receiver sought summary judgment — in the form of clawbacks — against
investor relief defendants.43 The receiver pursued investors for principal,
252
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“interest” earned on the investments, and prejudgment interest in an attempt to gather receivership funds and distribute them on a pro-rata basis.
The Southern District of Ohio agreed with the receiver that, even though
no wrongdoing was alleged against them, the investor relief defendants
had (1) obtained receivership funds to which (2) they had no legitimate
claim. The court granted summary judgment to the SEC.44 Four of these
relief defendants — Durietha Dziorney, Carl Jackson, Frederick Harris
and Allen George — argued that they had a legitimate claim to the funds
they received from the scheme.
Dziorney was Thorn’s fiancée during the scheme, but she, rather than
investing, simply received nearly $100,000 in cash and gifts (including a
$66,000 engagement ring) from Thorn’s pool of investor money;45 her arguments of legitimate claim were rightly rejected and the district court ordered
her to disgorge the funds.46 Jackson, Harris, and George were each innocent
investors, against whom no wrongdoing or complicity was alleged, whose
investment proceeds (plus prejudgment interest) were clawed back. Jackson had invested $285,000 in the notes and received only $282,320 back.
Although he was a “net loser,” the district court ordered him to disgorge
the full $282,320 plus $70,721 in prejudgment interest.47 Harris, also a net
loser, had invested $1,186,000 and received only $505,920 in return; the
district court ordered him to disgorge the full $505,920 plus $139,867 in
prejudgment interest.48 Finally, George, a net winner, had invested $37,000
and received $79,300 in return; the district court ordered him to disgorge the
$79,300 plus $13,495 in prejudgment interest.49
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the question for all four relief defendants was whether they had established a legitimate claim to the funds.50
No court has held that a gift gives rise to a legitimate claim, and Dzironey
was properly made to disgorge her gifts. However, the Sixth Circuit was
incorrect as to the three investor relief defendants. To order the three innocent investors to disgorge everything related to the investment scheme,
plus prejudgment interest, the court had to ignore the plain meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” the definition of which must include
contractual returns on debt.51
After giving token recognition to the standard relief defendant definition by quoting Cherif and other cases, the Sixth Circuit stated that, “Each
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of the relief defendants in this instance received ill-gotten funds and had
no legitimate claim to those funds.”52 The court then said, “Jackson, Harris and George [ ] received ill-gotten funds from the defendants. While
each of the three invested his own money in Thorn’s investment scheme,
the SEC showed that the money they received from the scheme came not
from profits on their investments but from the investments of others.”53
This focus on tracing scrambled the plain meaning of “legitimate claim.”
Tracing one’s profits to one’s principal has never been necessary to
establish ownership over investment proceeds, and such a requirement is
unforeseen and onerous from an investor’s view. Yet tracing was the only
method, in the Sixth Circuit’s eyes, by which the investors could have established a legitimate claim:54 “[Jackson, Harris, and George] failed to come
forward with any evidence rebutting the SEC’s tracing evidence. To survive
summary judgment in the face of the SEC’s evidence, the relief defendants
needed to present affirmative evidence, not just affirmative assertions, demonstrating a disputed issue of material fact. They did not do so.”55 Thus, the
investors — two of whom received less than their principal investment —
had to disgorge every penny, plus interest, that they had received according
to contractual agreement, even though no wrongdoing was alleged against
them. Thus, the court suggested that an investor may not have a legitimate
claim to the amount of his own investment and that, even in the absence of
wrongdoing, an investor can only prove a legitimate claim by tracing the
dollars he received from the scheme to the dollars he placed into the scheme.
This obvious misuse of the relief defendant tool came in the misguided
pursuit of equity. The Sixth Circuit, like the district court, wanted every
creditor to receive 42 percent of their principal in accordance with the receiver’s distribution plan.56 Indeed, the court mandated total disgorgement
even though it knew that Thorn had told potential investors before they invested that their money would be pooled with that of other investors in order
to reach optimal, threshold levels of investment.57 Thus, investors knew
from the outset — and the court knew before writing its opinion — that the
money would be pooled and would not be traceable by investors. The court
used traceability as the only factor determining whether an investor had a
legitimate claim even though it knew that not a single investor could avoid
disgorgement by tracing payout to principal. Thus, against plain meaning,
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the court turned the expansive “legitimate claim or ownership interest” evaluation into a single-prong test for tracing. This move has helped keep the
meaning of legitimate claim or ownership interest cloudy.
Protecting Investors
Investor relief defendants should be protected by courts’ recognition that
innocent investors have a per se legitimate claim to their investment proceeds
— at a minimum, the amount of principal invested. Probably the most important counterweight to George’s authority on this issue is Janvey v. Adams,
which is addressed below. However, other courts have also adhered to the
plain meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest,” finding that investors have a legitimate claim to funds stemming from their investments. For
example, in FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc.,58 the court held that Lisa
Mount, an investor and former employee of one of the companies in receivership, had to be protected from disgorgement. The corporation, which was
allegedly used as part of a fraudulent infomercial scheme, made distributions
to Mount, but there was no evidence that the distribution was anything but
a legitimate return on her investment in the corporation.59 Thus, the funds
could not be disgorged since there was significant doubt regarding the nature of the distribution. In this instance, the court properly recognized that,
since there was a strong possibility that the distribution was not just a gift or
siphoning of funds, Mount, as an investor, should be protected.
Other courts have similarly held, even in the context of full defendants against whom causes of action are asserted, that otherwise innocent
investors have a claim to investment funds.60 For example, in Johnson v.
Studholme, the receiver claimed, among other things, that the investors in
a Ponzi scheme investigated by the CFTC had not given value for their
returns on investment. The court disagreed, finding that the investors had
given value for their entire returns:
There was…no allegation that the defendants received these payments
with anything less than a good faith belief that it was a legitimate return on their investment as part of a contractual relationship…. The
plaintiffs’ contention that the defendants were not purchasers for value
is…wrong because the value given by the investors was, of course,
255
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their contributions and the risk that they may lose all or part of their
investment…. While the scheme may have been illegal, from an economic perspective there is no doubt that the innocent investors gave
value. They did all that was asked of them in the representations
which induced their investment.61
In Chosnek v. Rolley the receiver attempted to claw back investors’ returns on the theory of unjust enrichment, but the court protected investors’
principal: “[A]n innocent investor in a Ponzi scheme is not unjustly enriched
when he receives returns on his investment in good faith and while ignorant
of the scheme, so long as the returns do not exceed the amount of the original
investment. To the extent of the original investment, such are not subject to
claims made by later investors on the theory of unjust enrichment.”62 Even
though the theories against them are similar, the legitimate claim requirement should be more easily met for relief defendants than full defendants
being pursued under unjust enrichment or fraudulent transfer claims, since
relief defendants are usually defrauded already and they are not allowed full
defensive protections. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “It would be difficult
for equity to permit the Receiver to bring money into the receivership from
someone who was defrauded…. In effect, equity would be sanctioning further torment of a defrauded investor.”63

Employees as Relief Defendants
To demonstrate the arguments made when receivers or agencies attempt to claw back funds from employees, SEC v. Infinity Group64 and
SEC v. Amerifirst Funding65 are examined. As with the investor context,
problems have arisen in the employee-as-relief-defendant context when
courts do not recognize that workers have a legitimate claim to the compensation they earn in return for services.
SEC v. Infinity Group
In Infinity Group, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania started on the
right foot: with the proper definition of a relief defendant.66 However, it
refused to acknowledge that the principal’s wife, Susan Benson, had any
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legitimate claim to the funds she held and presumably worked for.67 To
reach this point, the court recognized that Mrs. Benson may have worked
for the funds, but stated that, “[T]o the extent Susan Benson earned any of
the funds which were transferred into these trusts, she did so in the service
of the very unlawful offering and sale of securities which is the subject
of these proceedings. It would be contrary to the securities law to allow
Mrs. Benson to launder the proceeds of a securities fraud by billing bilked
investors for services rendered in furtherance of that fraud. Illegal consideration is invalid consideration and thus cannot shield ill-gotten gains
from disgorgement.”68
Although the court likely arrived at the correct outcome (Mrs. Benson
probably was a wrongdoer or co-conspirator), it did so by misapplying its
own definition of relief defendant in two ways: first, Mrs. Benson stated
a legitimate claim to the funds; second, the court imputed wrongdoing to
her. Either of these misapplications should be enough to place a party
outside the relief defendant realm, and the Infinity Group court created
enormous uncertainty by overlooking its two obvious missteps. If Mrs.
Benson worked for the money, which the court seemed willing to accept,
she had stated a legitimate claim. Further, there is no question that the
court considered Mrs. Benson to be a wrongdoer — indeed, a launderer.
However, a relief defendant is, by definition, accused of no wrongdoing.
Since Mrs. Benson convinced the court that she might have worked for
the funds, she should have been released as a relief defendant and pursued
as a full defendant with full defensive rights, rather than being summarily
deprived of her assets. The court overlooked a legitimate claim — which
Mrs. Benson articulated — in favor of potential wrongdoing, thereby
muddling the relief defendant concept and keeping the door wide open for
suits against employees.
In addition to confusing a legitimate claim with wrongdoing, the Infinity Group court created an untenable standard for summary disgorgement:
if a person has been “in the service of the very unlawful offering and sale
of securities which is the subject of [the] proceedings,” she has no legitimate claim to the funds she holds. Presumably, this broad definition could
be applied to anyone who supports an unlawful offering, whether they
know the offering is unlawful or not. Under this standard, everyone from
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officers and directors to gardeners and janitors could be subject to summary disgorgement.
SEC v. Amerifirst Funding
In Amerifirst Funding, Jeffrey Bruteyn and others orchestrated an investment fraud through closely-held, affiliated corporations.69 Hess Financial was one of these corporations, and it provided consulting services
to Bruteyn’s Amerifirst Group, which was in receivership. Hess was added as a relief defendant, with the SEC seeking to disgorge any money that
Bruteyn had fraudulently obtained and then used to pay for consultations.70
The district court for the Northern District of Texas issued a default judgment against Hess, and in the later disgorgement quantification order, the
court explained its reason for complying with the SEC’s wishes: “Because
(1) the AmeriFirst entities paid Hess Financial with ill-gotten funds from
investors who purchased the illegal SDOs [(self-directed investment options)] and (2) Hess Financial does not have a legitimate claim to these
funds, Hess Financial should disgorge the ‘consulting fees’ it received
from the AmeriFirst entities. Although Hess Financial might have had a
legitimate claim to ‘consulting fees’ had it been unaware that its consulting
services were furthering securities fraud, Hess Financial cannot invoke a
good faith defense because its head, Bruteyn, was a principal actor in the
securities fraud scheme.”71
As with Infinity Group, the court almost undoubtedly arrived at the
correct outcome — that is, since Bruteyn headed Hess, the corporation
could be imbued with knowledge of the investment fraud. However, in
arriving there, the court misapplied the relief defendant tool. The court
recognized that the consulting services provided, and the fees charged,
to Amerifirst could have been legitimate and reasonable.72 Yet the court
moved on to say that Hess was a knowing participant in the fraud, and that
it could therefore not use a “good faith defense” — something reserved
only for full defendants, as in a fraudulent transfer action where the defendant must prove not simply a legitimate claim but good faith and value.73
Wrongdoers cannot be relief defendants, as the court noted in its own
definition: “[T]he SEC may seek disgorgement from ‘nominal’ or ‘relief’
defendants who are not themselves accused of wrongdoing in a securi258
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ties enforcement action where those persons or entities (1) have received
ill-gotten funds, and (2) do not have a legitimate claim to those funds.”74
Even though the court properly recognized this definition, it treated Hess
as both a relief defendant and a wrongdoer — a move that is clearly incorrect and one that leads to confusion. If the court saw that Hess, knowing of Bruteyn’s fraud, had rendered services for payment, it should have
dismissed him as a relief defendant since he had a legitimate claim to
the funds he held; the SEC could then have pursued Hess as a full defendant and wrongdoer. There are many doctrines under which Hess could
have been pursued as a full defendant, including fraudulent transfer, unjust
enrichment, or even violation of the securities laws. Instead, the court
blended wrongdoing with the relief defendant tool. This blending keeps
the door open for error and — the ultimate harbinger of economic wastefulness — uncertainty. Even if the court arrived at the correct result, it
confused the relief defendant concept — inviting future litigation based on
doubt that any particular relief defendant actually has a legitimate claim to
the funds she holds.
Protecting Employees
Innocent employees have a legitimate claim to the funds distributed to
them in return for their services. Although cases like Infinity Group and
Amerifirst are establishing precedent against this proposition, others recognize this solid, predictable principle. More authority is needed to firmly
establish it.
Ross is a very strong case for the plain meaning of “legitimate claim
or ownership interest” for employees because it explicitly instructs regulatory agencies and receivers to avoid what likely was done in Infinity Group
and Amerifirst Funding, viz. finding no legitimate claim because the relief
defendant might be a wrongdoer.75 In Ross, relief defendant Ernest Bustos, an ex-salesman of the entity in receivership (a company selling interests in payphones), appealed an order from the District of Oregon that he
disgorge all of his commission payments.76
The Ninth Circuit first noted that summary proceedings against relief defendants — including low standards for service of process and establishing personal jurisdiction, and summary disgorgement if there is no
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showing of a legitimate claim to the funds — were fair and helpful in
marshaling the assets of a receivership, but only as long as those pursued
fell cleanly into the definition of a relief defendant.77 The court noted that
Bustos clearly had a legitimate claim to the funds: “Bustos appears to be
no different from any other employee or vendor: he received compensation in return for services rendered. As such, he has presumptive title
to those commissions, and unless the Receiver can prove otherwise, it is
likely that the Receiver can disgorge those commissions only by showing
that Bustos has himself violated the securities laws.”78
After establishing that Bustos was not a proper relief defendant because he had a legitimate claim to the funds, the court went on to reprove
the receiver and the SEC for suggesting that Bustos should disgorge his
commissions because he was a wrongdoer in the fraud.79 Noting that the
SEC had many options by which to pursue wrongdoers and that relief
defendant disgorgement was not one of them in this instance, the court
said, “However the Receiver or the SEC chooses to proceed, we admonish
both to avoid improper shortcuts. Unless they can articulate some theory
of liability that does not turn on Bustos’s own violation of the securities
laws, they must formally serve him with process, properly obtain in personam jurisdiction over him, permit him to litigate fully all issues relating to
both the fact and scope of his liability, and do so, of course, subject to all
available legal and equitable defenses.”80
Thus, the court recognized that the SEC had violated two of the facets
of the relief defendant definition: that a relief defendant has no legitimate
claim to the funds and that a relief defendant is not a wrongdoer. The
court did not, as others have done, mix the concepts of legitimate claim
with wrongdoing, noting instead that a wrongdoer has the right to the due
process and defensive mechanisms offered to all full, or primary, defendants.81 Thus, Ross is a major piece of the firewall being built up against
cases like George, Infinity Group, and Amerifirst Funding. By following the reasoning in Ross, other courts would not only recognize that employees have a legitimate claim to their remuneration, but also that such
employees, if wrongdoers, have to be pursued as full defendants with the
ability to defend themselves.
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CFTC v. Walsh: A Template for Reasonably Deciding the Legitimate
Claim Question in Any Context
General principles should apply whenever a court is deciding whether
a relief defendant has a legitimate claim to the funds at issue. CFTC v.
Walsh is among the best examples of a court’s grappling with the plain
meaning of “legitimate claim.”82 There, Ms. Schaberg, the wife of the
supposed fraudster Walsh, was added as a relief defendant in a case by the
SEC and CFTC against her husband and his business partner.83 The funds
and luxury items the SEC and CFTC sought from Schaberg were traceable to Walsh’s misappropriation of his clients’ funds, but Schaberg had
acquired them in a divorce settlement agreement from Walsh some three
years before the SEC and CFTC brought suit against him.84 The question,
therefore, was whether Schaberg had acquired a legitimate claim to the
funds by signing the settlement agreement in which, she argued, she gave
up legal claims against her husband in return for the assets.85
The court admitted that it had never constructed guidelines on what
constitutes a legitimate claim or ownership interest.86 Attempting to form
a baseline, it accepted the notion that if Ms. Schaberg could establish that
the foregoing of her legal claims was in good faith and valuable,87 then
her assets would be protected from disgorgement — at least until she was
pursued under some other theory.88
Ultimately, the court had to certify questions to the New York Court
of Appeals rather than solve them itself since, taking the relief defendant
concept seriously rather than imputing Schaberg with wrongdoing or otherwise foregoing analysis, it recognized that the matters of value and property
were state law questions for which it had no answer.89 Even though the
court did not reach a final resolution, this case is a prime illustration of how
courts should conscientiously approach the legitimate claim question: first,
the court set reasonable parameters, based on other cases, as to what could
be considered a legitimate claim under the plain meaning of that term.90 It
recognized that, on one hand, gifts from a spouse — as in George — would
not give rise to a legitimate claim while noting that, on the other hand, receiving compensation for services rendered to an employer or purchasing
assets for value would give rise to such a claim. Second, after setting these
parameters, the court did not avoid the meaning of a legitimate claim by
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imputing wrongdoing to the relief defendant or order disgorgement simply
because the regulatory authority sought it. Instead, it engaged in thoughtful and serious analysis of what, under law and clear meaning, constitutes a
legitimate claim. Recognizing that it could not, even in equity, go further, it
turned the questions over to the state court for help.91
As long as courts do not gloss over the meaning of “legitimate claim
or ownership interest,” they will likely either come to a reasonable conclusion that stems from the words themselves and the legal standards they
represent (as in Ross), or reach a point at which they can go no further (as
in Walsh). In the context of relief defendant employees and investors in
fraudulent schemes, however, the way forward is clear in, almost certainly,
every case: courts should find that remuneration and principal invested
give rise to a legitimate claim. If the parties then can be sued as full defendants under fraudulent transfer, unjust enrichment, or fraud claims, then so
be it, but a party holding remuneration for services or investment principal
cannot be a proper relief defendant. There can be no other reasonable
reading of the agreed-upon language.

SEC V. STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK: AN ILLUSTRATION
OF THE LEGITIMATE CLAIM CONFUSION AND ITS COSTS
Receivers, who are officers of the court appointing them, exist to
benefit investors and other creditors.92 Yet when receivers (or regulatory
agencies, who are often the named plaintiffs in such suits) ignore the plain
meaning of “legitimate claim or ownership interest” to pursue investors’
principal or employees’ remuneration by adding these parties as relief defendants, problems arise. If the receiver loses, he hurts creditors of the
current receivership through misguided and wasteful litigation; if he wins,
he hurts creditors of future receiverships by creating or perpetuating uncertain definitions. In litigation stemming from SEC v. Stanford International Bank,93 the receiver — relying on flawed precedent such as George
— was ultimately prohibited from seeking disgorgement from investors
as relief defendants. This prohibition indicated to him that he would not
prevail on relief defendant claims against employees, so he dropped those
as well. The case presents a perfect opportunity to illustrate the conse262
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quences, both in terms of legal arguments and practical, economic costs,
of the uncertainty created by cases like George.

Background and Law in Janvey v. Adams
The Department of Justice, through a grand jury, indicted R. Allen
Stanford (the sole shareholder and chairman of Stanford Financial Group,
including Stanford International Bank) and his closest confidants and officers in June 2009 for violations of securities laws by running a massive
Ponzi scheme.94 Ralph Janvey, the SEC-picked equity receiver of Stanford
Group Company (a Houston-based broker-dealer subsidiary of Stanford
Financial Group with its own subsidiary corporations)95 was appointed by
the Northern District of Texas in February 2009. The court directed him to
recover traceable receivership assets for the benefit of investors and other
creditors.96 Janvey immediately froze investors’ and employees’ brokerage accounts and funds traceable to Stanford Financial Group in other
places.97 He then fired the employees.98
Although the SEC v. Stanford family of cases (both the SEC and ancillary suits) is large and growing, Janvey v. Adams is the most important relief defendant battle of the group — and possibly the most important relief
defendant case since George. There, the receiver, in an action ancillary
to the SEC suit, attempted to claw back investor relief defendants’ principal and employee relief defendants’ compensation before the Northern
District of Texas and, on appeal, before the Fifth Circuit.99 Only the issue
of investor relief defendants was reached by the Fifth Circuit, although
much of the same reasoning would apply to employee relief defendants,
as Janvey recognized when, after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, he released
the employees and re-added them as full defendants to be pursued under
unjust enrichment and fraudulent transfer (“UFTA”) claims.100
The receiver’s freeze, which began in February 2009, ultimately encompassed some 32,000 accounts.101 After a few months, Judge Godbey
of the Northern District of Texas recognized the freeze’s hardship on account holders, and ordered that the receiver either assert claims against
holders or release their accounts by early August 2009.102 To keep their
accounts frozen and hopefully claw back investment proceeds and remuneration, Janvey added as relief defendants hundreds of certificate of de263
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posit (“CD”) investors and ex-Stanford employees who had sold those
CDs.103 In his complaints against them, the receiver sought not only the
investors’ interest, but also their principal invested (even from numerous
“net losers,” or those who received less in investment proceeds than they
had invested in principal); from ex-financial advisors he sought base pay,
commissions, bonuses, and employee-forgivable loans.104 He rested his
complaints on the notion that the investors and former employees had no
legitimate claim to any of these funds because they were simply lucky, not
meritorious, to have received payments from other investors’ and creditors
funds before the scheme crashed down.105 The court-appointed independent examiner and the SEC itself quickly set themselves in opposition to
Janvey’s attempts to disgorge so much from these already-harmed parties
against whom no wrongdoing had been alleged. In fact, the SEC even requested that the receiver’s order be modified to disallow the receiver from
pursuing clawbacks for investor’s principal.106 Despite firm opposition,
Janvey plowed forward.107
Under a firestorm of arguments against Janvey’s continued freeze and
questionable pursuit of relief defendants, the district court held a hearing on July 31, 2009, in which the receiver, representatives of the relief
defendants, the examiner, and the SEC all participated.108 The hearing’s
main issue was the receiver’s motion to continue a freeze on hundreds of
investor and employee relief defendants — including a freeze on many
investors’ principal amounts received from Stanford. During the hearing, all parties (except the receiver) spoke against Janvey’s freeze on the
investors’ principal, and argued that such funds should be released immediately. The SEC vociferously objected to Janvey’s actions, and Janvey
himself stated that he had angered the SEC to such an extent by pursuing
investors’ principal that he was certain never to be chosen as a federal
equity receiver by the Commission again.109 When Judge Godbey issued
his order, there were few surprises: he allowed the freeze to continue as to
investors’ interest and he ordered release of investors’ principal amounts,
but he stayed the release until August 13, 2009, to give the receiver an opportunity to seek from the Fifth Circuit an extension of the freeze pending
appeal.110 Janvey received the extension,111 and the Fifth Circuit heard oral
arguments on November 2.112
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At the hearing, the receiver based his argument — that he should be
allowed to seek complete disgorgement from investors as relief defendants
for the purpose of an ultimate, pro rata distribution — on only two cases:
George and CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch.113 The court found neither
of these cases helpful to the receiver and instead construed them to support
its ultimate holding that Janvey could not pursue investors as relief defendants at all.114 Indeed, the court actually determined that investors have
a legitimate claim to all of their contractual investment proceeds — both
principal and interest.115
[T]he Receiver has failed to establish that the Investor Defendants lack
a legitimate claim to the CD proceeds they received from the Stanford
Bank. They are therefore not proper relief defendants…. It is undisputed that the Investor Defendants received the CD proceeds pursuant to written certificate of deposit agreements with the Stanford
Bank, which granted them certain rights and obligations. There was a
debtor-creditor relationship between the Investor Defendants and the
Stanford Bank based on written agreements well before the underlying SEC enforcement action against Stanford and the resulting receivership and restraining order. This constitutes a sufficient legitimate
ownership interest to preclude treating the Investor Defendants as relief defendants…. Therefore, the Receiver’s claims and motions as to
the Investor Defendants [regarding both principal and interest] should
have been denied completely.116
The court found a legitimate claim in the debtor-creditor relationship, while quoting Kimberlynn Creek Ranch itself for another example:
“[R]eceipt of funds as payment for services rendered to an employer constitutes one type of ownership interest and would preclude proceeding
against the holder of the funds as a nominal defendant.”117
No weight was given to whether payments to investors were traceable
to each investor’s contribution. In fact, interest from a Ponzi scheme can
never come from one’s own investment. Despite the obvious conflict with
the Sixth Circuit’s definition of legitimate claim in George, which equated
the term with tracing, the Adams court recognized no discrepancy between
the two cases. It cited George as being consistent with its own holding —
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but only for the nominal definition of relief defendants as parties with no
legitimate claim to the funds they hold, not for the interpretation of “legitimate claim.”118 It is at that point that George and Adams diverge. The two
cases (and nearly all other relief defendant cases) recognize the definition
of a relief defendant, but they differ markedly in what constitutes a legitimate claim.
Commentators soon after Adams noted that the window of confusion
had been left open.119 Still, the case is strong persuasive authority for the
treatment of relief defendants in the future. With any luck, courts will
begin consistently recognizing that the relief defendant definition does not
allow for recovery of investors’ principal (as held in Adams) or employees’
remuneration (as Janvey recognized soon after the Fifth Circuit decision
when he released the financial advisors as relief defendants).

The Practical, Economic Cost of Confusion
Janvey’s improper pursuit of relief defendants’ principal, though ultimately unsuccessful, produced four hardships for creditors, most of whom
were investors in the CD: first, it extended the litigation period for investors and financial advisors, placing a burden on them to stay engaged and
pay attorneys’ fees; second, the freeze denied hundreds of investors access
to their accounts for many months, thus imposing opportunity costs on
account holders; third, the pursuit delayed ultimate relief for all creditors;
fourth, by draining receivership funds and directing them to the receiver’s
pocket, it decreased the amount that creditors could be paid back. Inherent to these hardships is a conflict of interest for receivers: their job is to
capture as much of the receivership estate as possible for distribution to
investors, but they know that the more litigation they spawn, the longer
they will be paid out of the receivership itself. Thus, in their zeal to recoup
receivership assets, it may be easy for receivers to overlook the fact that,
“To undo all of these transactions would cause incalculable harm to hundreds of people, at a staggering cost, for which no commensurate benefit
would lie.”120 The purpose in illustrating these four issues is to give an
idea of how much time and money could be saved in a case like Adams if
receivers and courts adhered to the plain meaning of “legitimate claim or
ownership interest.”
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The First Problem: Extended Litigation
Extended, unnecessary litigation is an enormous financial hardship for
investors who have already been defrauded. This financial hardship occurs in at least two forms: opportunity cost for time spent on one’s own
defense, and direct cost paid to one’s attorney.
For months, Janvey and his team chased relief defendants who turned
out to be improperly pursued. These months represent lost time for the
relief defendants as well as lost money flowing to their defense attorneys.
That is, investors not only lost promised proceeds from their investment;
they also lost legal fees. This problem is especially acute with regard to
net losers. These people are by definition already harmed by the fraud
and should not be defending themselves at all unless they are wrongdoers
themselves. Just as the Sixth Circuit should have recognized of Jackson
and Harris in George, the net losers in Adams had a legitimate claim to
what little amount was held in their accounts; they should not have been
drained of even more money by paying attorneys’ fees and losing work
hours while defending against the receiver’s attacks. But litigation was
needlessly extended even for net winners and employees in the Stanford
case — for many, from April until November 2009.
Although no data exist to precisely quantify these losses, according to
the Examiner, Janvey was pursuing 913 relief defendants (investors and
employees) when the Fifth Circuit ruled against him on November 13,
2009.121 Since many relief defendants found relatively low fees by joining a group headed by one attorney,122 a mean low of $1,000 and a mean
high of $2,000 per relief defendant is a very conservative but plausible
estimate for the legal work undertaken for months on their behalf. As for
opportunity cost, this article conservatively estimates a mean low of 30
working hours lost (almost two hours per week for those pursued from late
July to November 13)123 and a mean high of 40 working hours lost (approximately two-and-a-half hours per week), at a low estimated mean rate
of $40 per hour and a high mean of $50 per hour. This is in view of the
fact that most relief defendants were officially pursued as such from July
28 to November 13 — even though the brokerage accounts of most added
as relief defendants on July 28 had been frozen since February and they
had been consulting with their attorneys well before being added to the
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suit. Using these very conservative numbers, it is estimated that the relief
defendants lost between $913,000 and $1,826,000 in attorneys’ fees, and
between $1,095,600 and $1,826,000 in opportunity cost, for a total loss of
$2,008,600–$3,652,000.
These rough estimates demonstrate the cost, however well-meaning,
imposed by the receiver on those he was meant to serve. Of course, the
fact that the receiver was seeking considerably more from relief defendants for pro rata distribution than the few million dollars his actions directly cost them shows that his approach was not completely devoid of
cost-benefit analysis.124 The point is that an understanding of the plain
definition “relief defendant” likely would have saved investors and employees millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees and opportunity cost alone.
That is, if Janvey could not have so easily molded the relief defendant
concept into a George-esque argument, he probably would not have taken
that losing stance in the first place.
The Second Problem: Account Freezes
In an account freeze that often accompanies an SEC investigation,
those with frozen accounts lose two sources of value: first, they cannot, as
they would normally, use their accounts to participate in the investments
of their choosing because the funds in the account remain in indefinite
limbo; second, since the funds cannot be invested, investors cannot use
the funds themselves or lost investment proceeds for wealth accumulation
or living expenses — indeed, some people (imprudently, perhaps) live day
to day on their brokerage accounts and investment proceeds and are financially crippled by a freeze.125
In February 2009, the court initially froze about 32,000 brokerage accounts with possible connections to the certificate of deposit, representing
approximately $6 billion in assets; since one of the Stanford entities — Stanford Group Company, the Houston-based umbrella entity for which Janvey
was receiver — was a registered broker-dealer, many of the accounts were
trading accounts that had nothing to do with the CD under investigation.126
Thus, after sorting them, Janvey began requesting release of mutual fund
accounts as well as those under $250,000 not tied to the apparent fraud.127
Later, Janvey requested release of thousands more accounts with no funds
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traceable to the CD proceeds.128 Finally, the court set a deadline, saying
that all frozen accounts must either be connected to a complaint or released
by August 3, 2009.129 On July 28, 2009, Janvey issued a list of 563 investors and financial advisors with frozen accounts that he was adding as relief defendants.130 These investors represented a combined total frozen of
$373,000,093.131 When the Fifth Circuit told Janvey that he could not pursue investors as relief defendants, it also told him that all investor accounts
had to be unfrozen.132 Thus, on November 13, 2009, all accounts — except
employee brokerage accounts — were available for release.133
Conservatively then, the unnecessary freeze was of $373,000,093 in
investor relief defendants’ accounts, which extended from July 28 to November 13, 2009. The 563 investors with frozen funds were harmed financially during the 16 weeks of improper freezing. Although this article
does not attempt the incredibly complicated task of quantifying the harm
stemming from investors’ inability to access or reinvest their money, receive regular payments from their investments, or regularly draw on their
accounts to live, the damage is undoubtedly substantial.
The Third Problem: Delay of Ultimate Distribution
Investors, particularly debtholders, expect to have access to their investment proceeds. Of course, in a Ponzi scheme investigation or other case of
investment fraud, investors will necessarily have to wait for regulators, the
receiver, and the supervising court to work things out. However, when a
receiver extends litigation by spending months seeking receivership funds
from unfruitful sources, investors are kept unnecessarily from the ultimate
distribution of the receivership for longer than necessary, thereby increasing
investors’ economic loss by taxing the time value of their money.
Janvey caused delay in the ultimate distribution of the receivership
by pursuing investors’ principal and employees’ remuneration in the relief
defendant context. Since there will be no final distribution (although there
may be some interim distributions) until the receiver has completed his
work of garnering receivership assets, this delay was imposed on all Stanford Financial Group creditors, even those who were not relief defendants.
When the dust finally settles, investors who did not happen to receive CD
payments can only hope to receive a few pennies on the dollar,134 but hav269
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ing to wait extra months because the receiver is chasing improperly-added
relief defendants adds insult to injury and again implicates the time value
of money. However, since the size and timing of the ultimate distribution
are so uncertain, the time value of the distribution is also uncertain. When
the numbers are known, the time value of the extra months spent trying to
fruitlessly claw back investors’ principal will be considerable, regardless
of the multiplier used.
The Fourth Problem: Depletion of the Receivership Estate
Receivers are paid out of the very receivership they are trying to protect and enlarge. Thus, the longer a receiver files claims, the longer he and
his team of attorneys, accountants, and others are paid; however, the more
the receiver is paid, the less is available for final distribution to creditors.
By April 2010, Janvey had asked for a total of $53,330,000 in fees and
expenses for him and his team. Nonetheless, receivers, as officers of the
court, must have their fees approved by the court, and the court can adjust
the receiver’s payment for services. Although each jurisdiction may have
slightly different factors for deciding how much of a receivers’ fees to pay,135
in this instance the Northern District of Texas was governed by the “Johnson factors.”136 One of these factors is the “amount involved and the results
obtained,” which gives some discretion to the court to discount a receiver’s
application if the fee application is large compared to the amount available
for distribution or if the receiver’s pursuit of funds is inappropriate.137 Using
this and other factors, the court temporarily discounted all of Janvey’s fee
applications by 20 percent, inviting him to reapply for the hold-back amount
when the size of the recovered receivership became clearer.138
In addition to the court’s 20 percent general discount, the court applied, partially accepting the argument of the SEC and the examiner,139 an
additional 15 percent temporary discount to fees requested from June to
November 2009, the period during which the receiver improperly pursued
relief defendants. This extra discount reflected the lack of “results obtained” during the period, and showed the court’s tempered concern that a
receiver should not be rewarded for charging down unfruitful paths. However, despite the 35 percent total discount for that five-month period, the
receiver and his team still received over eight million dollars of receiver270
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ship funds, and the lost 15 percent, like the general 20 percent discount, is
potentially recoverable.
Thus, from the beginning of the receivership to the present, the receiver has been rewarded handsomely from receivership funds. In fact, at
one point, Janvey had asked for approximately 34 percent of everything
he had recovered from the estimated $8 billion scheme.140 Further, of the
$53,330,000 requested from February 2009 until April 2010, he has to
date been awarded about $41,820,000 — approximately 78.42 percent of
the bill, which he claimed to be already cut by 20 percent before the court
imposed its own 20 percent discount.141
A receiver’s worth must be tied in part to the difference between the
amount he gathers for distribution and the amount of the receivership estate that he burns through. In Janvey’s case, this ratio does not seem to be
very high — much to the chagrin of investors, who are projected to receive
very little. For relief defendants, where a receiver successfully pursues
innocent investors’ funds for redistribution to other innocent investors, the
best that can happen is that, if successful in his clawbacks, the receiver
gets paid some of the money coming in while the leftover wealth gets redistributed. Of course, as against net winners in a Ponzi scheme, there is a
strong equitable argument in favor of this redistribution because anything
beyond their principal comes from other investors, but this argument loses
what appeal it has when applied to investors who received less than what
they put into the scheme.142 If the relief defendant concept were clear, it
is conceivable that the millions of dollars paid to Janvey and his team for
their improper pursuit of relief defendants would have remained in the
pockets of investors instead.
Thus, Janvey and his team, relying on a poor but available interpretation of the relief defendant tool, hurt investors by improperly engaging innocent and already-harmed parties in litigation, preventing these innocent
parties from accessing their accounts, delaying ultimate distribution, and
shrinking that distribution by burning receivership funds unnecessarily.

CONCLUSION
The meaning of a “legitimate claim or ownership interest” must be reinforced, particularly when obvious clawback targets are involved, such as
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investors and employees of fraudulent schemes. With cases like George,
Infinity Group, and Amerifirst Funding placing the plain meaning into confusion, other courts should take every opportunity to settle the definition
on its unambiguous foundation, thereby promoting judicial and economic
efficiency.
Virtually every case addressing them uses the same definition to describe relief defendants, but the meaning of one part of that definition (what
constitutes a legitimate claim) still varies widely — even though words are
clear on their face. This unpredictability leads to innocent investors and
employees, often already harmed by fraud, being further drained by costly
litigation and clawbacks. In Adams, investors’ and employees’ accounts
were frozen for months while litigation, based on uncertainty of the plain
meaning, dragged on, costing millions of dollars in fees and opportunity
cost. These scenes, which have been repeated in other Ponzi scheme and
financial fraud receiverships, will continue to play themselves out — with
funds being drained from investors and flowing toward receivers — until
courts calm the uncertainty by predictably interpreting the meaning of “relief defendant.” Of course, in cases of contractual relationships between the
entity in receivership and debt holders, the proper course of action will be,
as it was in Adams, to recognize a legitimate claim to both principal and
interest amounts under the contract; as a baseline, however, courts should
recognize that investors have a legitimate claim to their principal and that
employees have a legitimate claim to their reasonable remuneration.
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56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995); Mays v. Lombard, No. 3:97-cv-1010, 1998 WL
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Mar. 28, 2003).
45
George, 426 F.3d at 791.
46
Id., citing Thorn, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5709 at *2. For further discussion
of gift-holding relief defendants, see SEC v. Better Life Club of Am., Inc., 995
F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C.1998) (“gratuitous transferees who hold funds in
constructive trust for defrauded investors” cannot establish a legitimate claim
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to the funds).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 798.
51
As other courts have recognized, there is no need to demonstrate the full
bundle of ownership rights to avoid disgorgement as a relief defendant; all that
must be shown is a legitimate claim or ownership interest — something that
undoubtedly is created by investing funds and receiving contractual returns
on those funds. See, e.g., Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 834 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, 276 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2002); SEC v.
Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir.1991); SEC v. Founding Partners Capital
Mgmt., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (a legitimate claim or
ownership interest “does not require possession of the full bundle of ownership
rights that may exist in various types of property.”)).
52
George, 426 F.3d at 798.
53
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54
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For example, in United States v. Durham, 86 F.3d 70 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth
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55
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57
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58
648 F. Supp. 2d 202, 222 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d, 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010).
59
Here, the entity at issue was a close corporation, and Mount was a
shareholder. For purposes of determining whether she had a legitimate claim,
these facts make no difference and the court gave the proper analysis. To be a
relief defendant, she must not have been accused of wrongdoing — not even
wrongdoing imputed to an insider of a close corporation — and she must
have been holding funds to which she had no legitimate claim. She was not
accused of wrongdoing, but there was at least a possibility of a legitimate
claim to the distribution, which may have been compensation or a dividend
payment. Notwithstanding the fact that Mount was a shareholder in a close
corporation, if she either worked for the money (which is possible under the
facts and mentioned by the court) or received a return on investment, she had

279

FINANCIAL FRAUD LAW REPORT

a legitimate claim to the funds.
60
In this vein, it must be noted that investors’ principal is protected — as
long as they invested reasonably equivalent value and received returns in
good faith — even in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which provides,
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front/6314677.html.
102
Order, SEC v. Stanford, No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2009).
103
See generally Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants
94

282

RELIEF DEFENDANTS IN INVESTMENT FRAUD RECEIVERSHIPS

at 2, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009); see also Brief of
Appellant Ralph S. Janvey, No. 3:09-CV-0724-N (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009).
104
Id. (“CD Proceeds — loans, commissions, bonuses or other compensation
paid to financial advisors for selling CDs, and interest or redemptions to
investors — are little more than stolen money and do not belong to persons
who received such funds but belong instead to the Receivership Estate.”).
105
Id. at 13 (“Relief Defendants do not have any rightful ownership interest
that could justify their retaining possession of these funds, which are properly
considered assets of the Receivership Estate.”).
106
Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Modify Receivership Order, SEC v.
Stanford, No. 3:09-cv-0298-N (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2009). The SEC said
that it should be the only party with power to pursue clawbacks from relief
defendants and that the receiver’s misinterpretation of the law, which, Janvey
argued, permitted him to seek principal, was harming investors. Given the
SEC’s firm stance that principal was protected but interest was not, the Fifth
Circuit’s ultimate ruling — that investors had a legitimate claim to both
principal and interest — may have been an unforeseen boon for investors.
107
See generally Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2009) (SEC
attempted to prevent Janvey from seeking investors’ principal by seeking a
modification to his order).
108
See Stanford Financial Group Receivership, under heading “Receiver
Statement Regarding Court Hearing Addressing Clawbacks,” http://www.
stanfordfinancialreceivership.com (last visited December 5, 2010).
109
Judge Godbey also recognized the results of Janvey’s zealousness, telling
him that “everyone in the courtroom is angry with you.” Jeff Carlton, Lawyer
Wants 34% of Money Recovered in Stanford Case, US News, August 14, 2009,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/2009-0814-stanford-attorney_N.htm.
110
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Receiver’s Motion for Order
Freezing Assets Held in the Names of Certain Relief Defendants, Janvey v.
Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009).
111
Order Extending Injunction, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir.
August 11, 2009); Order Extending Injunction, Janvey v. Letsos, No. 09107615 (5th Cir. August 11, 2009).
112
Transcript of Oral Argument Before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals at 1,
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2010). The only party at oral
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argument to claim that investors had a legitimate claim both to principal and
interest was Michael Quilling, an ex-receiver and attorney for various investor
relief defendants. Id. at 41. The Examiner only advocated that investors keep
up to their principal amount. Id. at 31. The SEC focused on the freeze, saying
that it should be lifted because the receiver could not fulfill the elements of
a preliminary injunction. Id. at 44–47. Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that
investors have a legitimate claim to both principal and interest may have been
unanticipated by even the SEC.
113
276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that where a trial court does not find
credible the factual basis of a relief defendant’s asserted legitimate claim —
here, unverified testimony that the relief defendant had performed services
in return for exorbitant payments and credit card charges — the court can
disregard that claim and order disgorgement).
114
Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2009). The court in oral
arguments focused some of its attention on the fact that the SEC was opposed
to Janvey’s pursuit of principal, whereas in George and Kimberlynn Creek
Ranch the regulatory authority supported the actions. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 112, at 18–21. The court seemed to suggest that, if the
SEC had wanted to pursue the investors as relief defendants, the receiver might
have a stronger case. Such reasoning is, in my view, faulty and dangerous. It
questions not whether the relief defendant falls under the definition of a relief
defendant, but whether the plaintiff wants to pursue the person as a relief
defendant. Thus, the reasoning places too much power in the hands of the
regulatory agencies and gives insufficient weight to the actual definition that
everyone agrees on.
115
This result might reasonably be adjusted downward to include only principal
in other situations, particularly where investors do not hold certificates of
deposit with a face value and specific interest amount. That is, where a person
is an equity holder rather than a debt holder, a court might find that, in light
of the risk and, perhaps, ownership rights, equity calls for finding a legitimate
claim in the principal amount invested but not interest. Here, however, the
Stanford investors held notes that created a contractual relationship with the
bank, and both principal and investment amounts were covered under that
contract.
116
588 F.3d at 834–35 (citations omitted).
117
Id. at 835 (quoting CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, 276 F.3d 187, 192
(4th Cir. 2002)).
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Id. at n. 2 (“The George court did not indicate any intention to depart
from the precedents on which it relied. The opinion does not cast any doubt
upon our conclusion that the Investor Defendants here, against whom no
wrongdoing has been alleged, have ownership interests in and legitimate
claims to the proceeds of the CDs that they purchased from the Stanford Bank
just as thousands of other innocent investors have done.”).
119
See, e.g., May, 2010 Survey — Federal Regulation of Securities, Annual
Review of Federal Securities Regulation 65 Bus. Law. 923, 963 (“[I]t will
be important to early investors in Ponzi schemes … for the courts to thrash
out the criteria for determining when those early investors get to keep their
money, and when they must give it back for placement in a pool from which
they will then be paid only a pro rata share.”).
120
In re Independent Clearing House Co., 41 B.R. 985, 1005 n.20 (Bankr. Utah
1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 77 B.R. 843, 855 & n.19 (D. Utah 1987)
(holding that the bankruptcy court properly rejected the trustee’s attempt to
avoid all transfers to the Ponzi scheme’s investors, since, “Even were we to
find for the trustee on his first theory, the result here would not be equitable.”).
121
See Brief of Intervenor John J. Little, Court-Appointed Examiner at
Appendices, Janvey v. Alguire, No. 09-10761 (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2009).
122
For example, Phillip Preis, Esq., represented some 63 investors. Id. at ii.
123
Some relief defendants were added sooner than July. For example, many of
the financial advisors were added on April 15. Receiver’s Complaint Naming
Stanford Financial Group Advisors as Relief Defendants, SEC v. Stanford
Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2009).
124
See, e.g., Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at 4,
Janvey v. Adams, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009).
125
See, e.g., Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Pershing Ready to Handle Stanford
Requests, Reuters, March 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE5247SL20090305 (some investors had been relying on their
brokerage accounts and investment proceeds for such necessities as rent,
groceries, and payroll); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112,
at 38–40 (description of how deeply the improper freeze was affecting, for
example, retirees and pension funds).
126
See, e.g., Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Bystanders Pulled into Stanford
Financial Mess, Reuters, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE51J6CY20090220 (many who had not invested in the CD had their
accounts frozen).
118
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See, e.g., Second Order Authorizing Release of Certain Customer Accounts,
SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. March 12, 2009).
128
See, e.g., Order Granting Receiver’s Unopposed Motion to Approve
Procedures to Apply for Review and Potential Release of Accounts, SEC
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N, (N.D. Tex. March 27, 2009)
(giving Janvey the power to agree, with some investors, on the amount that he
would unfreeze).
129
Order, supra note 102.
130
This number is smaller than the 913 total relief defendants because some
relief defendants did not have accounts with the brokerages to which Janvey
had access.
131
Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at Appendix,
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009).
132
Adams, 588 F.3d at 834.
133
The announcement and instructions for obtaining control of accounts
were immediately posted to the receiver’s website: Stanford Financial Group
Receivership, at heading “Release of Remaining Frozen Investor Accounts
Following Fifth Circuit Ruling Regarding Claw Backs,” http://www.
stanfordfinancialreceivership.com/#FrozenRelease (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
134
See, e.g., Receiver’s Amended Complaint Naming Relief Defendants at 7,
Janvey v. Alguire, No. 03:09-CV-0724-N (N.D. Tex. July 28, 2009).
135
See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010) (approving of
Georgia’s lodestar method (including lodestar enhancements for particularly
superior attorney performance), which compares fees in the area for similar
services and uses various factors to determine reasonableness of fees, without
requiring subjective analysis like that under the Johnson factors).
136
When considering whether a fee award is reasonable, Johnson v. Ga.
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) sets out the
twelve factors the court should consider: “(1) the time and labor involved;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment
by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the political
‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.”
127
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Order Regarding the Receiver’s Third Fee Application at 2, SEC v. Stanford
Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010).
138
Id.
139
The SEC and the examiner actually argued that the Receiver should receive
nothing for work done during this time.
140
Jeff Carlton, Lawyer Wants 34% of Money Recovered in Stanford Case,
US News, August 14, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/brokerage/2009-08-14-stanford-attorney_N.htm.
141
Reply in Support of Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Second Interim Fee
Application at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 1, 2009). In his first and second applications for the payment of fees and
expenses, representing fees incurred from February 17 to May 31, 2009, the
receiver asked for $27.57 million from the receivership. Receiver’s Motion for
Approval of Interim Fee Application and Procedures for Future Compensation
of Fees and Expenses and Brief in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank,
No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (first fee application);
Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Second Interim Fee Application and Brief
in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 4, 2009) (second fee application). On September 10, 2009, the court
largely followed the SEC and examiner’s recommendations to temporarily
reduce the fees by 20 percent (potentially recoverable later) and to disallow
$2.1 million until it was supported by sufficient information. See Examiner’s
Archived Web Entries as of July 10, 2010 at 4, available at http://www.
lpf-law.com/UserFiles/File/2010%20Docs/Archive_No3_071010.pdf (last
visited Nov. 5, 2010). Thus, Janvey and his team received some $20.3 million
for the first hundred days. By late 2009, Janvey had asked for another $13.79
million in his third and fourth applications, representing mainly fees incurred
from June 1 to September 30, 2009. Receiver’s Motion for Approval of Third
Interim Fee Application and Brief in Support at 1, SEC v. Stanford Int’l
Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2009) (third fee application);
Examiner’s Archived Web Entries as of July 10, 2010 at 4, available at http://
www.lpf-law.com/UserFiles/File/2010%20Docs /Archive_No3_071010.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (detailing Janvey’s fourth fee application). In early
February 2010, the court agreed with the Receiver, Examiner, and SEC’s
jointly-proposed fee structure, temporarily discounting the bulk of the third
and fourth applications by 35 percent (and the $2.1 million, now supported by
more information, was discounted by 20 percent), and authorizing immediate
137
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payment of $10.39 million to the receiver. Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC
v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010). For
work from October 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, Janvey received $11.13 million,
even after the 20 percent holdback agreed to by the SEC and the Examiner.
Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv00298-N (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2010); Order for the Payment of Fees, SEC v.
Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex. Jun. 22, 2010); Order
for the Payment of Fees, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-cv-00298-N
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010).
142
At least one court has explicitly considered and rejected the type of
redistribution scheme addressed in George. In SEC v. Byers, 637 F. Supp.
2d 166, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, No. 10-312-CV, 2010 WL 4185097
(2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2010) and aff’d sub nom. SEC v. Malek, No. 09-3583-CV,
2010 WL 4188029 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2010), the court agreed with the receiver
that a George-like approach would be unwieldy and harmful: “[T]he Court
could order investors to repay all the cash distributions they received from
the Wextrust entities, and then the Receiver could make a distribution based
on each investors’ actual investment. The practical problems associated
with this approach, however, preclude it from being a viable option. Many
of the investors may not have the money, and litigation to collect it would be
expensive, time-consuming, and, in some instances, cruel.” (emphasis added).
Janvey, facing an even more complicated and widespread fraud, should have
followed this reasoning.
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